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CHAPTER 6 
Commercial Law 
ALFRED I. MALESON 
§6.I. General. The 1959 SURVEY year has proved to be a dynamic 
one for commercial law. Although little case law was made, the stat-
utes enacted - and the suggestion of statutes yet to be enacted - hold 
a promise of having a greater impact on actual commercial practices 
within the Commonwealth than did the passage of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.! The important policy changes this year occurred in 
the field of consumer credit, with a comprehensive scheme of regula-
tion for instalment sales of motor vehicles and the beginnings of regu-
lation of instalment sales involving other consumer goods. 
§6.2. The Uniform Commercial Code. The Massachusetts legisla-
ture amended Article 9 of the Massachusetts Uniform Commercial 
Code, entitled "Secured Transactions," to provide a specific form that 
may be used for financing statements and, in addition, has made a 
number of purely technical and corrective chang9.1 At the same time, 
the Pennsylvania legislature has amended the Pennsylvania version of 
the Uniform Commercial Code to conform more closely to the revised 
version that has been adopted by Massachusetts and Kentucky.2 Else-
where, both New Hampshire and Connecticut have joined the pioneers, 
the Code to become effective in New Hampshire on July 1, 1961,3 
and in Connecticut on October 1, 1961.4 Thus, substantially similar 
versions of the Code will soon be in force in five states. 
§6.3. Consumer credit: Motor vehicles. Although the Uniform 
Commercial Code contains a complete article on secured transactions, 
not only does it not purport to regulate consumer credit as such but 
it provides expressly that charges or practices illegal under usury 
laws, retail instalment sales acts, or the like, are not validated by the 
ALFRED I. MALESON is Associate Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law 
School. 
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§6.I. 1 As pointed out in the 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §I.2 at page 7: "In 
general, the Code makes no revolutionary change in the commercial law of Massa· 
chusetts." 
§6.2. 1 Acts of 1958, c. 542. 
2 Pa. Laws, 1959, Act 426. 
3 N.H. Laws, 1959, c. 247. 
4 Conn. Gen. Stat., tit. 42a (Supp. 1959). 
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article.1 In the past, regulation in Massachusetts was generally limited 
to the usury laws (which apply to loans, but not to finance charges)2 
and to some disclosure requirements and protections against forfeiture 
when mortgages or conditional sales agreements were used. However, 
since October 21, 1958 (and effective sixty days thereafter) a new chap-
ter has been added to the General Laws to provide a comprehensive 
scheme of regulation of consumer purchase of motor vehicles on the 
instalment plan.3 This chapter parallels quite closely the recently 
enacted New York Motor Vehicle Instalment Sales Act,4 with some 
minor and a few major variations. Perhaps the most striking difference 
between the New York and Massachusetts versions is the omission from 
the Massachusetts statute of a provision prohibiting the use of notes 
which, if negotiated separately by the seller, might cut off defenses which 
the buyer had against the seller. The New York act does allow the 
purchaser of such notes to acquire the rights of a holder in due course, 
since the buyer may agree to waive any defenses that he does not bring 
to the attention of the purchaser of the obligation within ten days after 
receiving notice of an assignment of the obligation. Thus, the buyer 
may not be able to defend a suit brought by the finance company by 
showing a breach of warranty which was not discovered until after 
the ten-day period; but he may show a complete failure of considera-
tion, or breaches of warranty that did come to light early - protections 
which a buyer in this Commonwealth does not have. 
The purposes of this statute are threefold: compulsory disclosure 
of the terms of sale, limitation on the amount of permissible finance 
charges, and prohibitions against certain harsh terms in instalment 
contracts. These regulations apply to every sale of a motor vehicle 
for consumer (as opposed to business) purposes in which the price is 
payable in two or more instalments and in which a security interest 
(such as a conditional sale agreement or chattel mortgage) in the 
vehicle is retained by the seller. There is no requirement that the 
seller be a "dealer," so that even a casual sale by an individual owner 
must comply with the statute if the price is payable in instalments and 
if a security interest is retained. (It may be noted that the New York 
act also limits its application to sales involving a security interest, 
although the companion "All Goods" actO regulates time sales of other 
consumer goods by dealers whether or not any such interest is retained.) 
§6.3. 1 G.L., c. 106, §9-201. 
2 G.L., c. 255, §12A, which still applies to sales of consumer goods other than 
motor vehicles, provides that the agreement must state in boldface type: "The 
Finance Charges Provided Herein Are Not Regulated by Law. They Are a Matter 
for Agreement between the Parties." Usury laws generally are found in G.L., c. 
140. 
3 Acts of 1958, c. 674. 
4 N.Y. Personal Property Law §§301-312. Although comparisons herein are made 
only to the New York statutes, a substantial number of other states have virtually 
identical legislation covering consumer purchases of motor vehicles, other goods, 
or both. For the text of these statutes, see CCH Conditional Sale-Chattel Mortgage 
Service. 
old. §§401-419. 
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Thus, the seller of an automobile who is willing to forego the security 
of a conditional sale contract or chattel mortgage need not comply 
with any of the provisions of this chapter, even those regulating the 
finance charges.6 
As part of the enforcement scheme for these regulations, all sales 
finance companies other than banks must secure licenses from the 
Commissioner of Banks, the licenses being revocable for a variety of 
reasons, including "defrauding any retail buyer to the buyer's dam-
age." T The definition of a "sales finance company" includes the seller 
himself, if he is in the business of holding retail instalment contracts.8 
Therefore, a dealer who regularly holds his own paper must be li-
censed; but an individual seller, although amenable to the regulatory 
provisions of the statute, needs no license. 
The disclosure provisions of the statute require that every retail 
instalment contract be in writing and signed by both buyer and seller 
and that the writing include specified information and notices in pre-
scribed size of type. The heart of the disclosure requirements relates 
to the determination of the price, since the validity of the finance 
charges may now be questioned. Contracts of conditional sale in the 
past also required a disclosure of the "cash price," but this was solely 
to make the buyer aware of his contract, and the term was not even 
defined.9 The requirement now is that the contract disclose the "cash 
sale price," and the term is defined to mean the price at which the 
seller would have sold to the buyer and the buyer would have sold 
to the seller for cash.lO Probably the practice of stating "list" price 
as the cash sale price and adding finance charges to that while still 
giving a discount to purchasers who pay cash will not disappear. Actu-
ally, the statute does not require the seller to sell to all buyers at the 
same price; on the contrary, apparently it would allow adding finance 
charges to whatever problematical price might have been agreed upon 
had the particular buyer been in a position to pay cash. In the ab-
sence of regulations, this could lead to a considerable amount of 
thwarting of one of the purposes of the statute. 
The requirement that the agreement be in writing is further sup-
plemented by a prohibition against signing an agreement containing 
blank spaces, except that identifying marks of the motor vehicle and 
the due date of the first instalment may be inserted afterward if the 
vehicle is not delivered at the time of execution of the contract.ll 
In addition, delivery of a copy of the contract to the buyer is required. 
In fact, this delivery is essential to the enforceability of the contract 
by the seller so long as the contract remains executory, for the buyer 
6 Rebates of finance charges in case of prepayment, however, are now compulsory 
even in the unsecured sale. See §6.4 infra. 
T G.L., c. 255B, §7. 
8Id.§1. 
9 G.L., c. 255, §12. 
10 Id., c. 255B, §§l, 9. 
11 Id. §12. 
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has a right to rescind the purchase at any time until either the contract 
is delivered or he accepts the vehicle. 
Permissible finance charges depend upon the age of the motor ve-
hicle, presumably on the theory that the greater risk in financing an 
older vehicle warrants a higher return. The rates vary from a maxi-
mum of 8 percent per year in the case of a new vehicle purchased in 
the year that it is new to 12 percent for vehicles over two years old.-:12 
This charge is applied to the principal balance. Therefore, since the 
entire principal is outstanding only until the first instalment is paid, 
the effective rate of interest approaches twice the stated rate. The 
contract may provide for an additional delinquency charge, but this 
charge may be imposed only if a default continues for at least fifteen 
days; and the maximum charge that may be imposed is the lesser of 
5 percent of the delinquent instalment or five dollars.13 If a buyer is 
consistently late by at least fifteen days, or if he is allowed to miss 
several instalments before being pressed for payment, these delinquency 
charges, although limited, may add substantially to the effective in-
terest. ' 
Prepaymeat at any. time, with a refund of unearned finance charges, 
must be permitted. This provision is one of the few protections that 
buyers in Massachusetts have had since 1955, and its application ex-
tends also to consumer goods other than motor vehicles.14 
A reading of the regulatory features of the statute would seem to 
indicate that there are six provisions that will be unenforceable if in-
cluded in a retail instalment contract and one which will be unenforce-
able if contained either in the retail instalment contract or in a sepa-
rate instrument executed in connection therewith.15 In a recent New 
York decision,16 a New York trial court held that an assignment of 
wages contained in a separate instrument executed in connection with 
an instalment contract was ineffectual, relying upon a provision, not 
found in the Massachusetts statute, requiring the contract to contain 
the complete agreement of the parties in certain respects. It is at least 
doubtful whether the prohibitions could be avoided in Massachusetts 
by putting them in a separate instrument.17 
The provision that clearly may not be contained in either the con-
tract or a separate instrument is one relieving the seller from liabilities 
for any legal remedies that the buyer may have against him. Appar-
12Id. §14. Note that Section 18 expressly disclaims any intention of regulating 
the charges on the purchase of a contract by a sales finance company. Therefore, 
if the "cash sale price" is set high by the dealer and if a sales finance company is 
able to purchase the contract from the dealer at a substantial discount, the finance 
company may realize considerably more on its investment than the consumer is 
theoretically permitted to pay. 
1S Id. §ll. 
14 G.L., c. 255, §12,B. For the method of computing the refund, see §6,4 infra. 
15 Id., c. 255B, §20. 
16 In re Finkelstein, II Misc.2d 938, 174 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
17 G.L., c. 255, §12, as it read prior to its revision in conformity with the Uniform 
Commercial Code, also required conditional sale contracts to contain the entire 
agreement. As Section 12 now reads, this is not expressed. 
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ently the buyer may waive his defenses yis-a-vis a sales finance com-
pany, although he would retain his recourse against the seller. The 
six provisions that are ineffective if contained in the contract but 
which might be effective if contained in a separate instrument (such 
as a note) relate to harsh collection practices. Several of these are 
invalid in Massachusetts anyway, such as provisions authorizing con-
fession of judgment 18 or allowing repossession if a breach of the peace 
is thereby committed.19 These provisions, therefore, would present 
no problem if contained in separate instruments. The validity of a 
wage assignment contained in a separate instrument, however, is left 
in some doubt. Perhaps of greater importance is one relating to 
acceleration. Unlike the New York act, the Massachusetts statute 
allows no acceleration in the absence of de£ault.20 If such a provision 
may be contained in a separate instrument, then it is possible that the 
note given in connection with an instalment contract might be acceler-
ated upon the happening of an event that might justifiably lead the 
holder to believe that payment might be impaired, although the right 
to foreclose the security interest might not be accelerated without an 
actual default. 
The penalty clauses of this statute provide for both criminal and 
civil redress. The criminal penalty of a fine or imprisonment or both 
applies to a violation of any portion of the chapter, and seems to apply 
whether or not the violation is willfuI.21 The civil penalty becomes 
available only if the violation is of certain portions of the chapter, 
concerned chiefly with disclosure, maximum permissible charges, and 
prohibited provisions. The penalty itself is simply that the person 
who has committed the violation is barred from recovering any finance 
charge, delinquency or collection charge, or refinancing charge.22 
This, coupled with the failure to mention rebates of charges already 
paid, would seem to make the civil penalty somewhat illusory in many 
cases. 
§6.4. Consumer credit: General. A change in a few words of Sec-
tion 12B of G.L., c. 255, approved on September 14, 1959, contains a 
small bombshell for Massachusetts lawyers.1 Although Chapter 255 
provides certain protection for instalment buyers in its disclosure 
provisions by requiring written agreements for consumer purchases 
when the seller retains title to the goods, no protection whatsoever 
was afforded in the past if the transaction was unsecured. However, 
Section 12B (providing for compulsory rebate of unearned interest if 
the buyer prepays his obligation) now applies to any sale of consumer 
goods on credit, secured or unsecured. This, coupled with the fact 
18 Id., c. 2111, §lllA. 
19 Id., c. 255, §lllE. 
20 In the absence of default, the New York statute prohibits only those accelera-
tions that are arbitrary and without reasonable cause. 
21 G.L., c. 255B, §21. 
22 Id. §22. 
§6.4. 1 Acts of 1959, c. 593. 
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that a special commission was established by the legislature on June 
12, 1959, to investigate the feasibility of control of retail instalment 
contracts2 might indicate that it is quite likely that the regulation of 
time-purchases of motor vehicles will be supplemented with further 
legislation covering other consumer goods. 
The actual computation of the rebate of unearned finance charges 
may be made by the "sum of the digits method," a simple method 
which takes into account the fact that a greater amount of interest 
should be attributed to the early periods of the payments than to 
the later periods, when the principal still due has been reduced. The 
rebate required is that portion of the total finance charges that the 
sum of the number of periods for which payment has been anticipated 
bears to the sum of the number of periods provided for by the con-
tract. Thus, if payments were to be made in twelve equal monthly 
instalments but if the remaining balance is paid after the sixth instal-
ment, the rebate would not be one half of the finance charge, but 
2Y7s, or a little over one fourth. This is arrived at by adding the 
numbers 1 through 6 for the anticipated payments and dividing by 
the sum of the series 1 through 12, since the original finance charges 
were based on twelve periods. 
The new section uses the term "consumer goods." In so doing, 
the definition given by the Uniform Commercial Code is intended,3 
so that goods are "consumer goods" if used primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes.4 Goods used both for personal and 
business purposes will have to be classified according to their primary 
use. 
§6.5. Banking: Dividends and investments. Section 60 of Chapter 
168 of the General Laws has been amended to allow savings banks to 
construe deposits made on or before the ninth day of a month as hav-
ing been on deposit one full month, and therefore entitled to ordinary 
dividends'! A practice common in many parts of the country is now 
specifically authorized for banks within the Commonwealth. Either 
the regulations or the by-laws of the bank must provide for this, so that 
existing banks do not have to amend their by-laws to avail themselves 
of this provision. 
The "Small Business Investment Act of 1958," passed by the 85th 
Congress,2 authorized the incorporation under federal or state law 
of privately owned "small-business investment companies" which 
could then provide long-term and equity-type financing for small'busi-
nesses, to supplement the business loan program of the Small Business 
Administration,3 which provides direct loans from the federal govern-
ment on a short-term or intermediate-term basis. These investment 
2 Resolves of 1959, c. 70. 
B Acts of 1957, c. 765, §18. 
4 G.L., c. 106, §9-109(1). 
§6.5. 1 Acts of 1959, c. 89. 
2 Pub. L. 85-699, 72 Stat. 689. 
B See 15 U.S.C. §§631·647 (1952). 
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companies may receive financial assistance from the federal govern-
ment through the purchase by the Administration of not more than 
$150,000 of their debentures. Section 302 of this act allows national 
banks and other member banks of the Federal Reserve System to invest 
in the capital stock of these small-business investment companies (up 
to a limit of 1 percent of the capital and surplus of such banks), and 
it also allows non-member insured banks to do so to the extent per-
mitted by state law. By Chapter 87 of the Acts of 1959,4 this Common-
wealth has authorized trust companies (the commercial banks in Massa-
chusetts) to invest in the stock as permitted by the federal act. The 
purpose of this provision in the federal act is to allow institutional 
investors otherwise limited by law from making direct long-term or 
equity-type investments in small business to do so indirectly to a lim-
ited extent. 
§6.6. Sales: Remedies of the seller. Neither the Uniform Com-
mercial Code nor the prior Massachusetts statutes specifies conversion 
as a remedy of an unpaid seller. Nevertheless, a count for conversion 
was allowed in a suit by the seller against the buyer in Rock-Ola 
Manufacturing Corp. v. Music & Television Corp.1 The plaintiff 
had sold phonographs to the corporate defendant on consignment, 
under a distributor's agreement whereby title was to remain in the 
seller until he had received the invoice price out of the proceeds of 
any sale by the buyer. Claiming that the buyer had sold certain 
phonographs without turning over the price out of the funds collected, 
the plaintiff-seller sued upon both an account stated and for conver-
sion. The trial judge found for the buyer on the conversion count, 
and for the seller on the count in contract. 
Since the plaintiff did receive a judgment on the contract count, at 
least against one of the defendants, it might seem that the availability 
of the count for conversion raises no practical question. As a matter 
of fact, the evidence of damages for conversion that the plaintiff had 
tried to introduce at the trial was that the invoice price was the fair 
market value of the phonographs. However, the point of practical 
departure between the contract and tort recovery would seem to in-
volve the measure of damages; and since on the retrial the plaintiff 
will not be limited to the attempted testimony which was improperly 
rejected in the first trial, he may prove greater damages in tort than 
in contract. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the circumstances adduced 
by the evidence could have constituted a conversion both by the cor-
porate defendant (the purchaser) and by the individual defendant 
(the purchaser's sole stockholder who was its president, treasurer, and 
general manager). Insofar as this decision allows a finding of liability 
of the buyer's president in tort although he was not liable in contract, 
it seems proper. But ins?far as it allows liability for conversion by the 
4 Amending G.L., c. 172, §§33, 43. 
§{i.6. 11959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1033, 159 N.E.2d 417. 
7
Maleson: Chapter 6: Commercial Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1959
§6.7 COMMERCIAL LAW 67 
buyer himself with the possibility that damages may exceed the price 
agreed upon by the parties, it does appear a little strange. Among 
the cases cited in support of this proposition, the one most closely in 
point was Crohon &- Roden Co. v. Rudnick.2 In that case, however, 
the property the Court found to have been converted was the checks 
received by the buyer which had not been turned over to the seller. 
This is not quite a finding that the buyer converted the goods them-
selves. 
Aside from any pleading problems or problems of bringing in a 
defendant - such as the buyer's agent - who might not have been 
liable in contract, it would seem that the decision in the Rock-Ola 
case ought not to be applied to give a seller who has retained title the 
right to receive a greater sum as damages from the buyer than the 
agreed-upon price. The difficulty in this case lies in the distinction 
between a "sale" on the one hand and the agency or bailment rela-
tionship of a true "consignment" on the other.s Even though the 
parties may have designated the transaction a "consignment," if in 
fact the distributor was to sell the goods as his own then it would 
seem that the transaction was actually a "sale on approval" or a "sale 
or return." At least with respect to the rights of creditors of the dis-
tributor, since this distributor did not seem to be generally known to 
be engaged in selling the goods of others, the transaction would be 
deemed by the Uniform Commercial Code to be a sale or return even 
though the term "on consignment" had been used.4 It is, perhaps, 
regrettable that the Court assumed the transaction to be a pure bail-
ment, without any discussion of the distinction. 
§6.7. Commercial paper: General. In Sun Oil Co. v. Redd Auto 
Sales, Inc.,l one merchant gave a blank signed check to another as an 
accommodation. The second filled in the amount and the name of his 
creditor as payee in the presence of the creditor's agent. When the 
accommodated merchant did not reimburse the accommodation 
drawer, payment was stopped. The Supreme Judicial Court held 
that the payee's status as a holder in due course was .not affected by 
the fact that he knew the instrument was incomplete when signed 
by the drawer, since it was complete when delivered to him. Accord-
ingly, the drawer's defense was not available. The Uniform Commer-
cial Code would require the same result, since neither knowledge by 
a purchaser that an incomplete instrument has been completed nor 
knowledge that any party has signed for accommodation is notice of 
a defense or claim.2 
A rather unusual situation was presented in Gill Equipment Co. v. 
Freedman.s The contract purchaser of certain power equipment drew 
2232 Mass. 555, 122 N.E. 741 (1919). 
S See 2 Williston, Sales §338 (rev. ed. 1948). 
" G.L., c. 106, §2-326(3). 
§6.7. 11959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 991, 159 N.E.2d Ill. 
2 G.L., c. 106, §3-304(c), (d). 
81959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 905,158 N.E.2d 863. 
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a check for the down payment payable both to the vendor and to the 
vendor's agent. Both payees endorsed the check which was then 
cashed, and the proceeds were taken by the vendor. The testimony 
warranted an inference that the agent was to see to the application of 
the check to discharge liens on the equipment if there were any. The 
equipment was never delivered, and the purchaser sued the agent to re-
cover back the proceeds of the check. The Supreme Judicial Court held 
that since the agent of the vendor had complete control over the 
check and had breached his fiduciary obligation to the drawer, he was 
liable to return the proceeds which he himself had not received. The 
case shows that there are still some actions on commercial paper that 
are not governed by statute, but by the law of trusts or quasi-contract. 
The fact that a check was involved was of little importance except 
insofar as it aided in proving the agent's control over the funds. This 
problem is of special interest to attorneys, who are frequently named 
as payees together with their clients. 
Several cases decided by the Supreme Judicial Court involved prob-
lems of construction. In Phinney v. Turcotte,4 a note secured by a 
mortgage provided for interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum, the 
first payment to be made on January I, 1955. Payments on principal 
were to be made annually, beginning on January I, 1956. Although 
payment of only the first instalment of interest was specified, the court 
held that "It is implicit in the note that thereafter interest was to be 
payable at the times when instalments of principal became due." 6 
Since subsequent payments of interest were not made, the mortgage 
was adjudged to be in default, and foreclosure was allowed. 
The place of presentment of a note negotiated to a bank for col-
lection was the issue in Batchelder v. Granite Trust Co.6 The holder 
of a time note placed it with the defendant bank for collection. The 
note did not specify either the place of presentment or the address of 
the maker. In accordance with its custom, the bank sent a notice by 
mail to the maker informing him that the bank held the note and that 
it would fall due on the specified date. The bank continued to hold 
the note through maturity and, upon non-payment, sent notices of 
protest to the maker and indorsers. The maker subsequently became 
bankrupt, and the holder, claiming that the indorsers were discharged 
by failure of the defendant bank to make a proper presentment, 
brought this suit against the bank.7 Although Section 96 of G.L., c. 
107, provides that presentment of a note of this type is made at the 
proper place if made at the usual place of business or residence of 
the person to make payment, the Supreme Judicial Court held that 
this section does not necessarily disapprove the earlier practice sanc-
tioned by cases prior to the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments 
4338 Mass. 728, 157 N .E.2d 247 (1959). 
6338 Mass. at 730, 157 N.E.2d at 248. 
61959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 589,157 N.E.2d 540. 
7 The plaintiff's attempted introduction of testimony in a prior action against 
an indorser, to prove that the indorser had in fact been held to have been dis-
charged by this failure, was rejected since the defendant was not a party to that 
action. 
____________ -i{,./ 
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Law in 1898 which allowed banks to make presentment by mailing a 
notice without actually having someone take the note to the maker's 
residence or place of business. As the Court mentioned, this practice 
is specifically authorized for transactions occurring after October 1, 
1958, by the Uniform Commercial Code.s Nevertheless, the case is an 
important one because of its approach - the reluctance of the Court 
to allow a statute to rule out prior law by implication - even though 
the precise issue it decides may be moot for future transactions. 
While the Batchelder case faced a problem the decision of which 
would be foreclosed under the Uniform Commercial Code, the case of 
Cassiani v. Bellin09 concerned a choice of law that would appear to 
be left open in the Code as well as in the prior statutes. A two-year 
instalment note provided for acceleration at the option of the holder 
upon any default of thirty days, the balance becoming "due and pay-
able on demand." Although it is clear that no "demand" is necessary 
to entitle the holder of a demand note to bring suit, the defendant 
makers contended that this suit for the accelerated balance could not 
be brought without a demand. (Had the question been the time that 
the statute of limitations began to run, the contentions of the parties 
would, of course, have been reversed.) The Supreme Judicial Court 
noted the conflict of authorities and that the matter was one of first 
impression in this Commonwealth, and decided that to require the 
holder to give a special notice stating that he has elected to accelerate, 
as a condition precedent to suit, would place an unnecessary burden 
upon the recovery of the loan. The decision was somewhat hedged, or 
at least softened, by the recognition that by the time of this decision 
the original maturity date had already passed. Thus, if the result of 
any particular acceleration in a future case was harsh and inequitable, 
it might be possible to limit somewhat the effect of this decision. 
Despite the careful analysis in the Uniform Commercial Code of 
the time that a cause of action accrues,lO the Code does not seem to 
preclude either determination of this issue on facts similar to the 
Cassiani case. If in any particular case the bringing of suit for the ac-
celerated balance without a prior demand would result in a forfeiture 
by someone who might have been able to pay if given the opportunity, 
or in some other harsh consequence, the acceleration might well be 
construed as a violation of the obligation of good faith imposed by 
Section 1-203. Therefore, the possibility of requiring a demand in 
some cases seems to be left open in the Code, although a demand might 
be unnecessary in the absence of special circumstances. 
§6.8. Secured transactions: Assignment by vendee. The defendant 
in Cadillac Automobile Co. of Boston v. Engianl had purchased an 
automobile from the plaintiff on a contract of conditional sale. Some-
time later, she requested the plaintiff to transfer her rights under the 
contract to her brother. The plaintiff effected the transfer by deleting 
8 C.L., c. 106, §4·201(1). 
9338 Mass. 765 , 157 N .E.2d 409 (1959). 
10 C.L., c. 106, §3·122. 
§6.8. 11959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 595,157 N.E.2d 657. 
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the defendant's signature from the contract and securing as a substi-
tute her brother's signature, and the defendant was required to sign 
an instrument entitled "Personal Guaranty by Third Party" which 
stated that it was "in consideration of the making of the within con-
tract." Subsequent events included a default in payment, repossession, 
seizure of the automobile by the United States because of its use in the 
illegal transportation of narcotics, and this action in contract on the 
guaranty for the balance due. 
The trial judge found the defendant liable as a guarantor, and the 
defendant (among other grounds of alleged error) contended that the 
conditional sale to her brother was unenforceable because no copy 
of the contract was delivered to him, urging that the guaranty was 
therefore a nullity. In this appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court held 
that as the only contract for conditional sale between the plaintiff 
and this defendant was the original one, the defendant's contention 
was not well founded. 
This decision raises - and leaves unanswered - several problems 
of more than academic interest, especially in view of the new Chapter 
255B of the General Laws.2 At the outset, it ought to be noted that 
the only civil penalty imposed upon a conditional vendor who fails 
to del,iver a copy of the contract involved in an executed sale is a bar 
to the recovery of finance charges, interest charges, and fees.3 The 
contract itself is certainly not unenforceable, as claimed by the de-
fendant. Therefore, if the transaction was in fact a recission of the 
first sale and a new sale to the defendant's brother, noncompliance 
with the requirement of delivery of a copy of the contract should 
have operated to the benefict of the defendant as guarantor to the 
extent of the charges imposed, but to no greater extent. On the other 
hand, if the effect of the guaranty and the substitution of names in 
the original contract was simply a consent by the conditional vendor 
to the transfer of the property by the vendee, it would seem that no 
burden whatsoever of compliance with the statutory requirements is 
placed upon the vendor.4 However, if the vendor desires to keep his 
security interest effective against purchasers from this assignee, he will 
have to file a financing statement,5 and to do this the transaction will 
have to be treated as a new sale. Therefore, it would behoove a dealer 
to weigh the inconvenience of entering into a new contract against the 
diminution in the security interest resulting from a consent to the 
assignment, and to draw his papers accordingly, in no uncertain terms. 
2 Chapter 255B is discussed in detail in §6.11 supra. 
3 G.L., c. 255, §13G; c. 255B, §22. 
4 Conceivably, the first vendee may have become a "retail seller" under G.L., 
c. 255B, §l, subject to the criminal penalties imposed for failure to comply in the 
resale. Although the vendee might have considered the assignment to be by way 
of gift, the assignee does agree to pay the remaining price in instalments, and the 
vehicle is subject to a security interest. Admittedly, this is not the type of transac-
tion for which Chapter 255B was enacted, but the wording of the statute could be 
so construed. 
5 G.L., c. 106, §9-307(2). 
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